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Abstract
Effects of opportunity for thought and
individual differences in intolerance of
ambiguity on attitude polarization were
examined. It was expected that opportunity
for thought and intolerance of ambiguity
would have an interactive effect on attitude
polarization. This hypothesis was not
supported. There was, however, an
unexpected interaction between intolerance of
ambiguity and the order of events in this
experiment. When individuals’ self-awareness
was heightened, individuals intolerant of
ambiguity had attenuated attitudes; when
individuals’ self-awareness was lessened,
individuals intolerant of ambiguity had
polarized attitudes. Limitations of this study
(e.g., self-report measure) and future
directions (e.g., priming effects) for this
research were also discussed.
During the 2004 presidential election,
the people of the United States were divided
on which candidate to vote for as president.
President George W. Bush was campaigning
for reelection and Senator John Kerry was
campaigning to win the position of president.
Some individuals favored President George
W. Bush because he supported personal
responsibility for social security. Other

individuals favored Senator John Kerry
because he supported government
responsibility for social security. Individuals’
attitudes not only differed toward each
candidate, but individuals’ attitudes also
varied in intensity (i.e., extremity). In some
cases, individuals donated money in support
of their party, whereas other individuals stood
along busy roadways flashing signs in support
of their party. Some individuals voted; others
did not vote. Perhaps individuals’ behavior
during the election reflected their attitudes
about each candidate. It may be possible that
individuals who campaigned for their
candidate or gave donations to a political
party displayed more attitude extremity than
individuals who simply voted or held private
opinions.
How and why do individuals’ attitudes
become so extreme that individuals would
spend valuable time campaigning or
personally funding a political party? One
explanation for these individuals’ extreme
attitudes is the influence of thought on
attitudes. When individuals think about
people, objects, events, or issues, initially
positive attitudes may become more positive
and initially negative attitudes may become
more negative (e.g., Clary, Tesser, &
Downing, 1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975;
Tesser & Sadler, 1973). This phenomenon is
known as self-generated attitude change (see
Tesser, Martin, & Mandolia, 1995, for a
review). If, for example, Jesse Jackson, a
human rights activist, makes a good
impression with potential supporters, then
those supporters will think positively about
Jesse Jackson. The more these supporters
think positively about Jesse Jackson, the more
favorable their attitudes become toward Jesse
Jackson.
Self-Generated Attitude Change
There are two processes underlying
self-generated attitude change (Tesser 1978;
Tesser et al., 1995). First, when individuals
engage in thought, individuals may change
their beliefs (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, 1991;
Tesser & Cowan, 1977; Valenti & Tesser,
1981). When asked to think about the 2004

presidential debate between Bush and Kerry,
for example, individuals do not simply recall
information about that event in a mechanical
way. Thinking is a dynamic process meaning
that when asked to recall information about
the 2004 presidential debate, individuals often
change what they believe to be true about that
event.
During thought, individuals may
change their beliefs so that these beliefs
become consistent with individuals’ original
evaluation of those people, objects, events, or
issues (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995).
Individuals can change their beliefs by: a)
generating new attitude-consistent beliefs, b)
reinterpreting inconsistent beliefs, and c)
discounting inconsistent beliefs. Individuals
creatively change recalled information to
make consistent what they now know and
what they initially believed.
Second, there is a connection between
feelings and beliefs (e.g., Chaiken & Yates,
1985; Clary et al., 1978; Rhode, 2001).
Individuals’ feelings about the 2004
presidential debate are determined, in part, by
beliefs those individuals hold about that
event. When recalling information about the
2004 presidential debate, for example,
individuals would probably feel favorably
about John Kerry if they believe he possesses
morals and has their best interest at heart.
Because there is a connection between how
individuals feel and what individuals believe,
the affective portion of attitudes (i.e.,
feelings) and the cognitive portion (i.e.,
beliefs) of attitudes are dependent on each
other to some extent.
In sum, attitudes depend on beliefs.
When individuals think about their beliefs,
individuals change their beliefs thereby
making those beliefs evaluatively consistent
with original beliefs about an attitude object
(i.e., people, objects, events, or issues). As
individuals reconstruct their beliefs about
people, objects, events, or issues, individuals
increase evaluative consistency in their
beliefs. In turn, individuals make their
attitudes extreme as a result of thought.
Generate Additional Information.
Individuals could produce evaluative

consistency in their beliefs by generating
additional attitude-consistent beliefs. For
example, Tesser and Cowan (1975) found that
participants presented with a set of four
adjectives describing a person generated more
additional descriptions of a person than did
participants presented with a set of eight
adjectives describing a person. More
importantly, as the number of set adjectives
describing a person increased, the more
difficult it became for participants to generate
additional attitude-consistent adjectives. If
individuals, for example, believe that Howard
Dean is warm, caring, and compassionate,
then those individuals may feel favorably
toward Mr. Dean. Because those individuals
feel favorably toward Mr. Dean, they may
also believe that he is sensitive and forgiving.
Although these individuals may not have
actually seen Mr. Dean act in such a way,
they may generate those new beliefs based on
their initially favorable impression. Thus,
these individuals have supported their initially
favorable impression by generating additional
favorable beliefs about Howard Dean. Other
researchers have found that individuals
generate attitude-consistent beliefs when
given a chance to think about people, objects,
events, or issues (e.g., Harton & Latane,
1997; Leone & Ensley, 1985).
Interpret Existing Information.
Individuals could also produce evaluative
consistency in their beliefs by reinterpreting
ambiguous information. For example, Tesser
and Cowan (1977) presented participants with
a group of three personality traits in which
there also was either an ambiguous adjective
(i.e., could be interpreted as either positive or
negative depending on context) or an
unambiguous adjective (i.e., could be
interpreted as positive or negative regardless
of context) as part of a description of a
person. Participants were more likely to
polarize their attitudes when presented with
an ambiguous trait as part of a description
than when presented with an unambiguous
trait as part of a description. More
importantly, participants reinterpreted
ambiguous traits making those traits
consistent with other traits describing a

person. Individuals, for example, may witness
Howard Dean during a speech exchanging
hostile words with John Ashcroft. Those
individuals may interpret Mr. Dean’s words
as passionate rather than angry in order to
preserve their favorable feelings about
Howard Dean. Those individuals may feel
more favorably toward Mr. Dean if they
believe he is passionate rather than angry.
Hence, those individuals reinterpret
ambiguous information in order to preserve
their favorable impression about Howard
Dean. Other researchers have concluded that
individuals reinterpret their beliefs about
people, objects, events, or issues making
those beliefs evaluatively consistent (Feather,
1967; Lord, Ross, Lepper, 1979; Lord, 1989).
Refute Inconsistent Information.
Individuals may also produce evaluative
consistency in their beliefs by refuting
inconsistent beliefs. For example, Chaiken
and Yates (1985) identified participants as
either high or low in structural consistency.
Participants high in structural consistency are
compelled to maintain consistency between
affective (i.e., feelings) and cognitive (i.e.,
beliefs) components of their attitudes.
Participants low in structural consistency are
not compelled to maintain consistency
between affective and cognitive components
of their attitudes. These experimenters
instructed participants to read essays by
proponents or opponents of a relevant issue
(i.e., capital punishment or censorship) and
then to write essays on those issues.
Participants high in structural consistency
were more likely than participants low in
structural consistency to refute and counter
argue inconsistent information. More
importantly, participants high in structural
consistency more than participants low in
structural consistency polarized their attitudes
as a result of the connection between thoughts
and feelings. Individuals, as in the previous
example, may witness Howard Dean
exchanging hostile words with John Ashcroft.
These individuals could refute any of Howard
Dean’s actions that are inconsistent with their
favorable beliefs about him. These individuals
may feel favorably toward Mr. Dean if they

refute that Howard Dean is an angry man. In
turn, these individuals can still maintain
favorable beliefs about Howard Dean if they
refute that Mr. Dean is an angry man. Thus,
these individuals’ beliefs remain consistent
which results in favorable feelings toward
Howard Dean. Other researchers concluded
that individuals refute and counter argue
attitude-inconsistent beliefs in order to
maintain evaluative consistency in their
beliefs (e.g. Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Plous, 1991;
Pomerantz, Chaiken & Tordesillas, 1995).
Situational and Dispositional Factors
Although researchers found that when
given opportunity for thought individuals
polarize their attitudes, there may be
situational and dispositional factors that are
involved in individuals’ ability to polarize
their attitudes. Attitude polarization may be
attenuated if individuals thoughts are
constrained (e.g., Leone & Aronow, 1992;
Leone, Minor, & Baltimore, 1983; Leone &
Baldwin, 1983; Tesser, Leone, & Clary,
1978). Attitude attenuation occurs when
individuals make their evaluation of an
attitude object less extreme than their initial
evaluation of that attitude object. Individuals
may constrain their thoughts by responding to
reality constraints or process constraints.
Individuals may implement reality
constraints during thought when in the
presence of people, objects, events, or issues
(Tesser, 1976). A reality constraint occurs
when individuals compare their beliefs
concerning people, objects, events, or issues
with the actual characteristics of those people,
objects, events, or issues. Individuals, for
example, may believe that smoking marijuana
causes people to be violent and aggressive.
Individuals in the presence of people
intoxicated on marijuana displaying nonviolent behavior are forced to reevaluate their
beliefs concerning the effects of smoking
marijuana. When confronted with the realities
of people, objects, events, or issues during
thought, individuals’ beliefs about those
people, objects, events, or issues may be
influenced.

Researchers found that attitude
attenuation occurs when in the presence of a
reality constraint. Leone (1984), for example,
found that participants asked to think about a
feared object (i.e., snake) in the absence of
that object polarized their attitudes more than
did participants asked to think about a feared
object (i.e., snake) in the presence of that
object. In a case study by Rothbaum, Hodges,
Kooper, Opdyke, Williford, and North (1995),
a patient suffering from acrophobia (i.e., fear
of heights) reported decreased anxiety and
avoidance of heights after being exposed to a
computerized, virtual simulation of varying
degrees of heights. More importantly, that
patient reported feeling less afraid of heights
after being exposed to varying degrees of
heights than he did before being exposed to
heights varying degrees of heights.
In sum, when individuals are faced
with a reality constraint, they may realize that
some of their beliefs are inaccurate or
illogical. When faced with a reality constraint,
individuals may also realize that some of their
feelings are exaggerated. If individuals
abandon faulty beliefs, then attitude
attenuation occurs.
Individuals’ attitude polarization may
also be reduced by process constraints.
Process constraints are a way of manipulating
thought such that individuals are forced to
examine the derivation of their beliefs about
people, objects, events or issues (Tesser et al.,
1978). Individuals limited by process
constraints are forced to think about thinking.
Individuals, as in the previous
example, may believe that smoking marijuana
causes people to be violent and aggressive.
When those individuals are asked to reason
why they believe smoking marijuana causes
people to become aggressive, those
individuals are forced to scrutinize the
legitimacy of their beliefs concerning the
aggressive effects of smoking marijuana.
Some of those individuals may reason that
smoking marijuana causes aggression because
they felt out of control after smoking
marijuana. Some of those individuals may
believe that smoking marijuana leads to
aggression because they saw an expert in the

media reporting about the aggressive effects
of marijuana. Other individuals may think that
marijuana causes people to become
aggressive because they saw a movie (e.g.,
Reefer Madness) which portrayed characters
smoking becoming aggressive after smoking
marijuana.
Once those individuals identify why
they believe that smoking marijuana causes
aggression, they are able to question the
legitimacy of those beliefs. After those
individuals scrutinize the validity of their
beliefs about the effects of smoking
marijuana, some of those individuals may
reason that not every person who smokes
marijuana loses control. Individuals may
reason that media reporters have biases and,
therefore, begin to question the legitimacy of
information acquired from those media
reporters. Other individuals may reason that
movie producers may exaggerate the effects
of smoking marijuana to boost viewer
interest. If these individuals identify faulty
logic in their beliefs about the aggressive and
violent effects of smoking marijuana, then
those individuals may abandon those faulty
beliefs. If individuals abandon faulty beliefs,
then attitude attenuation occurs.
Researchers found that process
constraints are effective in reversing the
attitude polarization process. In a study by
Tesser et al. (1978), for example, participants
instructed to reason why they strongly feared
public speaking reported less anxiety about
public speaking than did participants not
instructed to think about public speaking.
Participants instructed to think under a
process constraint found faulty logic in their
beliefs about public speaking. In turn, these
participants reduced their fear of public
speaking. In a study by Leone and Baldwin
(1983), participants asked to think in a
constrained manner (i.e., process constraint)
about a feared object (i.e., snake) displayed
more approach behavior toward that feared
object than did participants not asked to think
in a constrained manner about a feared object.
Those participants asked to scrutinize why
they feared snakes, presumably, abandoned
false beliefs concerning their fear of snakes.

In turn, those participants increased approach
behavior toward that snake.
In sum, when individuals reevalutate
their beliefs in terms of where those beliefs
were derived, individuals may identify faulty
reasoning (Tesser et al., 1978). When
individuals scrutinize the validity of their
beliefs, those individuals may also realize
their beliefs are not plausible. If individuals
abandon false beliefs, attitude attenuation
occurs.
Attitude polarization may also be
related to certain dispositional factors (i.e.,
personality differences). The way in which
individuals think about people, objects,
events, and issues, could moderate the attitude
polarization process. Some individuals have
styles of thinking in which these individuals
make other beliefs consistent with their
original beliefs concerning an attitude object
(i.e., people, objects, event, and issues). Other
individuals have certain styles of thinking in
which these individuals do not make other
beliefs consistent with their original beliefs
concerning an attitude object. These
personality differences could be differences in
intolerance of ambiguity. How, then, might
intolerance of ambiguity be related to self
generated attitude change?
Intolerance of Ambiguity
Intolerance of ambiguity, as defined
by Budner (1962), is a tendency for
individuals to perceive ambiguous situations
as threatening. An ambiguous situation is one
in which individuals cannot structure or
organize an environment because of a lack of
sufficient cues from that environment. Budner
identified ambiguous situations as lacking
familiar stimuli (i.e., unfamiliar situation),
including multiple stimuli (i.e., complex
situation), or including incongruent stimuli
(i.e., insoluble situation). Individuals, for
example, may watch newscasts concerning
the war on terror. If these individuals watch a
newscast concerning the war on terror on Fox
Network and then watch a newscast
concerning the war on terror on CNN, these
individuals may receive conflicting newscasts
concerning the war on terror. These

conflicting views concerning the war on terror
is an example of an ambiguous situation.
Individuals can either be intolerant of
ambiguity or tolerant of ambiguity.
Individuals intolerant of ambiguity
perceive ambiguous situations as threatening
because these individuals need clear and
consistent cues from their surroundings in
order to organize and structure an
environment (Budner, 1962). When
confronted with an insoluble situation (i.e.,
incongruent cues), these individuals may not
seek multiple solutions. When confronted
with a complex situation (i.e., multiple cues),
these individuals may not integrate multiple
cues. When confronted with a novel situation
(i.e., lack of familiar cues), these individuals
may not connect unfamiliar cues with
previously acquired knowledge. Individuals
intolerant of ambiguity experience stress and
react prematurely when presented with
ambiguous stimuli. If possible, individuals
intolerant of ambiguity seek situations that
provide certainty or avoid ambiguous stimuli
all together (Furnham, 1994).
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity,
however, perceive ambiguous situations as
desirable, interesting, and challenging
because these individuals are able structure
and organize their environment based on an
array of unfamiliar stimuli (Budner, 1962).
When confronted with an insoluble situation,
individuals tolerant of ambiguity may work
out multiple solutions. When confronted with
a complex situation, these individuals may
integrate multiple cues. When confronted
with a novel situation, these individuals may
connect unfamiliar cues with previously
acquired knowledge. Individuals tolerant of
ambiguity do not experience stress or react
prematurely when presented with ambiguous
stimuli. Individuals tolerant of ambiguity
perceive ambiguous situations as desirable
and challenging (Furnham, 1994).
Individuals who differ in intolerance
of ambiguity also differ in the degree to
which they prefer novel tasks versus familiar
tasks (Furnham, 1995). Individuals intolerant
of ambiguity prefer familiar tasks as opposed
to novel tasks because a familiar task includes

sufficient, recognizable cues that allow these
individuals to structure and organize that task.
Individuals who engage in a familiar task
know what to expect from that task and no
new interpretation of cues is required to make
sense of that task. In a study by Feather
(1969), participants high in intolerance of
ambiguity showed less preference for a novel
task as opposed to a familiar task than did
participants low in intolerance of ambiguity.
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity,
however, prefer novel tasks as opposed to
familiar tasks (Furnham, 1995). Individuals
tolerant of ambiguity are able to interpret
ambiguous cues because these individuals are
able to structure a task that includes either
familiar or unfamiliar cues. These individuals
do not need an existing definitive
interpretation of a task in order to understand
how to complete that task. Ebling and Spear
(1980), for example, found that individuals
tolerant of ambiguity perform better on
ambiguous tasks than do individuals
intolerant of ambiguity. Although preference
for a task is different from performance on a
task, it is probable that because tolerant of
ambiguity individuals prefer novel tasks they
are likely to attend to novel tasks and
therefore perform well on novel tasks. In
general, researchers have found that
participants intolerant of ambiguity more than
participants tolerant of ambiguity have a
lowered ability to cope with an ambiguous
task (e.g., Sidanius, 1978).
Individuals who differ in intolerance
of ambiguity also differ in the degree to
which they form rigid categories of stimuli
(e.g., people, objects, events, or issues).
Individuals intolerant of ambiguity tend to
form strict, fixed categories of stimuli
(Bochner, 1965). These individuals, for
example, may categorize people as either
politically conservative or politically liberal.
Although some people may hold politically
moderate views (i.e., neither conservative nor
liberal views), intolerant of ambiguity
individuals are likely to categorize people
with politically moderate views as either
liberal or conservative because these
intolerant of ambiguity individuals are unable

to cope with views that are inconsistent with
politically conservative or liberal views.
Intolerant of ambiguity individuals are likely
to place all political views into one of two
political categories (i.e., conservative or
liberal) because these individuals formed rigid
definitions of politically conservative and
politically liberal people.
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity,
however, do not tend to form strict, fixed
categories of stimuli (Bochner, 1965). These
individuals, for example, may also categorize
people as either politically conservative or
politically liberal. Tolerant of ambiguity
individuals, however, are not likely to
categorize all people as either politically
conservative or liberal. These individuals
recognize politically moderate views and are
able to cope with views that are inconsistent
with politically conservative and liberal
views. Tolerant of ambiguity individuals are
not likely to place people into specific
political categories because these individuals
have not formed rigid definitions of
politically conservative or liberal people.
Individuals who differ in intolerance
of ambiguity also differ in the degree to
which they reject or accept unusual stimuli.
Individuals intolerant of ambiguity tend to
reject unusual or different stimuli (Bochner,
1965). These individuals, for example, may
believe that all women are incapable of
holding a position in the Federal Government.
If these individuals learn of a woman who
was elected into the House of
Representatives, these individuals may
attribute her success to something other than
her abilities to represent her district.
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity,
however, do not tend to reject unusual or
different stimuli (Bochner, 1965). These
individuals are not likely to believe that all
women are incapable of holding a position in
the Federal Government. Although there are
more men than women holding a position in
the Federal Government, these individuals
can conceptualize that women holding a
position in the Federal Government gained
that position through similar means as men in
that position. Thus, these individuals do not

reject the notion that women are just as
capable as men of holding a position in the
Federal Government.
Individual differences in intolerance
of ambiguity are related to extreme attitudes.
One example of an extreme attitude is
prejudice. Prejudice is defined as an “an
aversive or hostile attitude toward a person
who belongs to a group, simply because he
belongs to that group, and is therefore
presumed to have questionable qualities
ascribed to the group” (Allport, 1954, pg 7).
Hassan and Khalique (1987) looked at
intolerance of ambiguity and prejudiced
attitudes toward women, caste-status, and
religious affiliation. In general, participants
who held prejudiced attitudes toward women
also held prejudiced attitudes toward castestatus and religious affiliation. These
researchers also found that participants who
were high in intolerance of ambiguity
reported more prejudiced attitudes overall
than did participants who were low in
intolerance of ambiguity.
Galbreath and Feinberg (1973) looked
at the relationship between intolerance of
ambiguity and attitudes toward employment
of disabled persons. As predicted, intolerant
of ambiguity participants reported more
negative attitudes toward employment of
disabled persons than did tolerant of
ambiguity participants. More importantly,
when exposed to both a highly ambiguous
employment situation and a highly ambiguous
employee description, intolerant of ambiguity
participants more than tolerant of ambiguity
participants reported negative attitudes toward
employment of disabled persons. Feinberg
(1971) also found that participants intolerant
of ambiguity reported more negative attitudes
toward disabled persons than did tolerant of
ambiguity participants. Lal and Hassel (1998)
and Dermer (1993) explain why these
individuals intolerant of ambiguity hold
negative attitudes toward disabled persons.
These researchers found that individuals
tolerant of ambiguity more than individuals
intolerant of ambiguity considered additional
information about a complex situation (e.g.,
highly ambiguous description of disabled

persons) to be useful when dealing with that
complex situation.
Intolerance of ambiguity is also
related to other extreme attitudes such as
racism. Sadinuis (1977), for example, looked
at the relationship between intolerance of
ambiguity and socio-political ideology. Sociopolitical ideology was comprised of four
separate components (i.e., racism, politicaleconomic conservatism, sexual repression,
and authoritarian aggression). Sadinuis found
that racism was more strongly related to
intolerance of ambiguity than were his other
three components of socio-political ideology.
In other words, racism was a function of
increased intolerance of ambiguity.
As mentioned earlier in this paper,
individuals can make their beliefs consistent
by generating additional attitude consistent
beliefs, reinterpreting attitude inconsistent
beliefs, and discounting attitude inconsistent
beliefs. Individual differences in intolerance
of ambiguity are also related to two of the
three microprocesses in the self generated
attitude change model as proposed by Tesser
(1978). Specifically, intolerance of ambiguity
is related to reinterpretation of inconsistent
beliefs and discounting of inconsistent beliefs.
Individuals engage in reinterpreting of
beliefs when individuals make new beliefs
about an attitude object consistent with their
initial beliefs about that attitude object.
Individuals, for example, may believe space
exploration is necessary for the advancement
of the human race. If these individuals are
exposed to new information about efforts to
expand space exploration, then these
individuals are likely to reinterpret this new
information so that it is consistent with their
initial beliefs about space exploration.
Reinterpreting inconsistent information,
however, does not happen at the same rate for
all individuals. Individuals intolerant of
ambiguity are more likely than individuals
tolerant of ambiguity to reinterpret
information making new information
consistent with initial beliefs. Feather (1967)
found that participants intolerant of ambiguity
biased their evaluations of religious
syllogisms in a manner that was consistent

with their attitudes more than did participants
tolerant of ambiguity. Feather concluded that
participants’ religious affiliation influenced
evaluations of religious syllogisms made by
intolerant of ambiguity individuals.
Researchers have concluded that this
information selectivity may be accounted for
by biases in information processing (e.g.,
Lord, Ross, Lepper, 1979).
Individuals engage in discounting of
beliefs when individuals refute or ignore
beliefs about an attitude object that is
inconsistent with their initial beliefs about
that attitude object. Individuals, for example,
may believe that the war on terror is vital to
the safety of citizens in the United States. If
these individuals are exposed to discrepant
information about the war on terror, then
these individuals are likely to retain only
information that supports their attitudes about
the war on terror. Discounting of inconsistent
information, however, does not happen at the
same rate for all individuals. Individuals
intolerant of ambiguity tend to engage in
discounting of inconsistent information more
than do individuals tolerant of ambiguity.
Feather (1969), for example, exposed
participants to arguments for and against
American intervention in Vietnam.
Participants intolerant of ambiguity were
more likely than participants tolerant of
ambiguity to ignore information that was
inconsistent with their initial attitude about
American intervention in Vietnam and
recalled information that was consistent with
their initial attitude about American
intervention in Vietnam. That is, individuals
intolerant of ambiguity gave more attention to
information that was consistent with their
initial attitude than to information that was
inconsistent with their initial attitude.
Hypotheses
Because individuals intolerant of
ambiguity perceive an ambiguous situation as
threatening, these individuals may try to
reduce their anxiety when confronted by
ambiguous situations by a) generating new
attitude-consistent information about a
situation in order to make that situation

unambiguous, b) reinterpreting inconsistent
information about a situation in order to make
that situation unambiguous, or c) discounting
inconsistent information about a situation in
order to make that situation unambiguous.
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity, however,
are not likely to engage in the aforementioned
behaviors because these individuals process
information about ambiguous situations
differently than do intolerant of ambiguity
individuals. If individuals process information
about ambiguous situations differently, then
this individual difference variable may
moderate the extent to which individuals
polarize their attitudes. The present study was
designed to test the following hypotheses.
In general, it is expected that
individuals will experience increased attitude
polarization with an increased opportunity for
thought. Individuals will not, however,
polarize their attitudes at the same rate. This
attitude polarization process will be
moderated by individual differences in
intolerance of ambiguity such that individuals
intolerant of ambiguity will experience
greater attitude polarization than will
individuals tolerant of ambiguity. Last,
individuals intolerant of ambiguity will
experience greater attitude polarization with
an increased opportunity for thought than will
individuals tolerant of ambiguity regardless of
thought opportunity condition. These
hypotheses will be investigated in the
following experiment.
Method
Participants
A total of 162 students were recruited
from undergraduate psychology courses for a
study titled “Individual Differences in
Political, Social, and Campus Issues.” By
volunteering for this study, participants
earned extra credit for a class. Other extra
credit opportunities were offered so that
students were not obligated to volunteer only
for extra credit.
There were 103 females and 59 males
involved in this study. Equal number of
females and males were not necessary
because sex of participants was not a

predictor variable in this study. A majority of
this sample (71%) was Caucasian. Most
participants in this study (79%) were between
18 and 21 years of age. The University of
North Florida is uncharacteristic of most
universities in that it has older, non-traditional
students.
The experimenter excluded from
analysis data of three participants because
those participants failed to follow
instructions. Participants were given a chance
to ask questions before they signed a written
informed consent. Participants were treated in
accordance with the American Psychological
Association Ethical Principles and Code of
Conduct (American Psychological
Association, 2003).
Procedure
A female experimenter greeted
participants individually and informed them
that this study was designed to assess attitudes
towards various political, social, and campus
issues. She also informed participants about
any potential benefits and risks associated
with their participation, reminded those
participants of their right to withdraw from
participation at anytime without penalty, and
assured those participants their responses
would remain confidential. Participants were
given an opportunity to ask questions.
Participants then signed a written informed
consent form prior to completion of this
study. The experimenter of this study
interviewed participants on an individual
basis.
The experimenter of this study
counterbalanced the order in which
participants completed interviews about their
attitudes and completed the Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 1962). Half of
these participants first completed the
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale and later
completed an interview. The other half of
these participants first completed an interview
and later completed the Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale. The remaining description
of this procedure section was organized as if
participants first completed the interview

portion and later completed the Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale.
During the interview portion of this
study, participants read a series of statements
displayed on note cards. Participants were
shown statements about a variety of political,
social, and campus issues. Participants read a
series of statements that were either positively
worded (e.g., “Parking should be free for
professors.”) or negatively worded (e.g., “Gay
men and lesbian women should not have the
right to get married.”). Order of statements
was randomized.
After each issue was presented on a
note card, participants verbally expressed
their attitude by stating aloud a number on a
15-point, Likert-type scale. Endpoints of that
scale were labeled strongly agree (+7) and
strongly disagree (-7). Midpoint was labeled
neutral (0). Other points on that scale were
numbered to correspond to varying degrees of
agreement or disagreement. Participants could
choose a “+3” or “+4” to indicate moderately
favorable attitudes. Participants could also
choose a “-3” or “-4” to indicate moderately
unfavorable attitudes. The experimenter used
a separate coding sheet to record responses.
Those responses were not available for
participants viewing.
After participants expressed their
attitudes towards each issue, the experimenter
selected two issues for which participants
expressed moderately positive attitudes (i.e.,
+4) and two issues for which participants
expressed moderately negative attitudes (i.e.,
-4). Prior to viewing these note cards again,
participants were randomly assigned to one of
two conditions: low opportunity for thought
(45 seconds) or high opportunity for thought
(90 seconds).
The experimenter then told participants
there were a few particular issues of interest.
Half of these participants reread an issue for
which they held moderately negative attitudes
first and the other half of these participants
reread an issue for which they held
moderately positive attitudes first. The order
in which participants reread each set of issues
(i.e., positive or negative) was
counterbalanced. Participants were then asked

by the experimenter to think about each issue
they had just read. She asked participants to
read one of these four issues of interest and to
concentrate on that issue. She instructed
participants to
Focus on this particular issue only. You
may want to think about how you feel
about the issue. You may want to think
about your beliefs about the issue. Or
you may want to think about important
facts and arguments you know about the
issue. Just think about the issue I am
about to show you until I tell you to stop
thinking about it (Leone, 1995).
The experimenter instructed participants
to stop thinking once the allotted opportunity
for thought was over. Participants were then
asked by the experimenter to rate their
attitudes about each issue again using the
same 15-point scale as mentioned above. She
told participants
Now that you have had the chance to
think about this issue, I would like
you to tell me once again how you
feel about this issue. Sometimes
people’s attitudes change even over as
short a period of time as this. You
may or may not feel the same way
about the issue. Using the scale in
front of you, please indicate how you
feel now about the issue (Leone,
1995).
The experimenter recorded participants’
attitudes on a separate coding sheet. After
participants finished rerating their attitude, the
same procedure was repeated for the
remaining three issues. Participants were
given either 45 seconds or 90 seconds of time
for thought on all four issues.
Attitude polarization was scored such
that higher scores were indicative of a greater
tendency for attitude polarization (Leone,
1995). If an initially favorable attitude (i.e.,
+4, +5) became more favorable (i.e., +6, +7)
after thought, then attitude change was
assigned a score of “1”. If an initially
unfavorable attitude (i.e., -4, -5) became more
unfavorable (i.e., -6, -7) after thought, then
attitude change was also assigned a score of
“1”. If an initially favorable attitude (i.e., +5)

became less favorable (i.e., +4, -3) after
thought, then attitude change was assigned a
score of “-1”. If an initially unfavorable
attitude (i.e., -5) became more favorable (i.e. 4, +3) after thought then, attitude change was
also assigned a score of “-1”. If attitudes
remained unchanged after thought, then
attitude change was assigned a score of “0”.
The use of a trichotomous index is preferred
over an algebraic index because a
trichotomous index is proven to have greater
validity and have less sensitivity to errors than
an algebraic index (Tesser, 1978). Scores for
all four issues were summed together.
Individual differences in intolerance of
ambiguity were assessed using the 16-item
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner,
1962). Budner maintains that ambiguous
situations are novel, complex, or insoluble.
Budner wrote several items to assess
individuals’ perceived threat from novel
situations (i.e., no familiar cues), complex
situations (i.e., multitude of cues), and
insoluble situations (i.e., different cues
suggest different structures). Four items were
designed to assess attitudes of perceived
threat from novel situations, nine items were
designed to assess attitudes of perceived
threat from complex situations, and three
items were designed to assess attitudes of
perceived threat from insoluble situations.
Participants rated their degree of
agreement or disagreement with each of the
statements in that scale. Participants
responded using a 5-point Likert-scale:
strongly agree, slightly agree, uncertain,
slightly disagree, and strongly disagree. Half
of those statements were worded positively
(e.g., “A good job is one where what is to be
done and how it is to be done are always
clear.”) and half of those statements were
worded negatively (e.g., “People who insist
upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how
complicated things really are.”). Responses to
negatively worded items on that scale were
reverse scored. Answers to items were scored
such that high scores were indicative of
greater intolerance of ambiguity and low
scores were indicative of greater tolerance of
ambiguity. Based on a median split of the full

range of scores, participants scoring above the
median were classified as intolerant of
ambiguity and participants scoring below the
median were classified as tolerant of
ambiguity.
In order to validate his Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale, Budner (1962) administered
his scale to sixteen different samples.
According to Robinson and Shaver (1973),
internal consistency was determined by
measuring Cronbach’s alpha for scores from
those sixteen different samples. The range of
Cronbach’s alpha for scores for these samples
was from .39 to .62. In a separate study,
Robinson and Shaver (1973) obtained a testretest reliability of r= .85 for scores on this
scale after a 2 to 4 week period. For scores in
this study, Cronbach’s alpha was .61.
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity
Scale (1962) and three other intolerance of
ambiguity scales (i.e., Norton’s Multidimensional Scale [Norton, 1975], Rydell’s
Scale [Rydell & Rosen, 1966], and Walk
Scale [O’Connor, 1952]) were administered
to a single sample (Furnham, 1994). Scores
on Norton’s Multi-dimensional Scale,
Rydell’s Scale, and Walk’s Scale were
significantly correlated with scores on
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. The
correlation coefficient between scores on
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale and
scores on Norton’s Multi-dimensional Scale
was, r=.47, p<.05. The correlation coefficient
between scores on Budner’s Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale and scores on Rydell’s Scale
was, r=.57, p<.06. The correlation coefficient
between scores on Budner’s Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale and scores on Walk’s Scale
was, r=.44, p<.06.
Finally, participants answered
demographic questions about their sex, race
(i.e., Caucasian/White, Hispanic, African
American/Black, Asian American, or Other),
political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, or
Independent), and age (18-22yrs, 23-27yrs, 28
yrs-32yrs, 33yrs-37yrs, 38 or more).
Participants were thanked for their time and
given an opportunity to ask any questions.
The experimenter of this study then dismissed
her participants.

Results
Overview
This study was a 2 (ambiguity:
tolerant versus intolerant) x 2 (opportunity for
thought: 90 seconds versus 45 seconds) x 2
(order of presentation: personality measure
then attitude measure versus attitude measure
then personality measure) factorial design.
Order of presentation was included in this
analysis for exploratory purposes. Attitude
polarization was the dependent variable in
this study. Attitude polarization was
calculated by summing scores for all four
issues that participants rated a second time.
Main Analyses
It was expected that attitude
polarization would be greater for individuals
who had ample opportunity for thought (i.e.,
90 seconds) than for individuals who had little
opportunity for thought (i.e., 45 seconds). It
was also expected that attitude polarization
would be greater for individuals intolerant of
ambiguity than for individuals tolerant of
ambiguity. Dispositional factors (i.e.,
intolerance of ambiguity) and situational
factors (i.e., opportunity for thought) were
expected to have an interactive effect on
attitude polarization such that individuals
intolerant of ambiguity having ample
opportunity for thought would experience
greater attitude polarization than would
individuals in any other condition.
Statistically, it was expected that there
would be a main effect for opportunity for
thought and a main effect for individual
differences in intolerance of ambiguity. It was
also expected that there would be a two-way
statistical interaction between intolerance of
ambiguity and opportunity for thought. Last,
if there were an interactive effect of order of
presentation, then there would be a statistical
three-way interaction between opportunity for
thought, individual differences in intolerance
of ambiguity, and order of presentation.
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to
determine if there was a main effect for
opportunity for thought, a main effect for
individual differences in intolerance of
ambiguity, and an interaction between

opportunity for thought and individual
differences in intolerance of ambiguity. There
was not a statistically significant main effect
for opportunity for thought or intolerance of
ambiguity, both F’s<1.00. There also was not
a statistically significant interaction between
opportunity for thought and intolerance of
ambiguity, F<1.00. A three-way ANOVA
was conducted with order of presentation as
an exploratory variable to determine if there
was an interaction between opportunity for
thought, intolerance of ambiguity, and order
of presentation. This three-way interaction
was non-significant, F <1.00.
Exploratory Analysis
There was, however, an unexpected
marginally significant interaction between
order of presentation and intolerance of
ambiguity, F (1, 152) = 3.06, p < .08. In order
to find the source of this interaction, a simple
main effect analysis was conducted (i.e., two
one-way ANOVAs). Participants’ completion
of the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale then an
attitude measure was assessed first and
participants’ completion of an attitude
measure then the Intolerance of Ambiguity
Scale was assessed second. Intolerance of
ambiguity was the predictor variable and
attitude polarization was the criterion
variable. There was a significant difference
between individual differences in intolerance
of ambiguity when participants completed the
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale and then an
attitude measure, F(1,81)= 3.66, p<.06.
Participants tolerant of ambiguity who first
completed the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale
(M = 0.74, SD = 1.89) experienced greater
attitude polarization than did participants
intolerant of ambiguity who first completed
the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (M = -.06,
SD = 1.81). Participants tolerant of ambiguity
(M = .06, SD = 2.14) and participants
intolerant of ambiguity (M = .39, SD = 2.06)
who first completed an interview, however,
were equally likely to experience attitude
polarization, F <1.00.

Ancillary Analysis
During the thought manipulation
procedure in this study, participants thought
about issues that were given moderately
favorable ratings (i.e., +4) and moderately
unfavorable ratings (i.e., -4). The researcher
in this study chose issues for which
participants had moderately favorable or
moderately unfavorable attitudes in order to
prevent ceiling effects or floor effects.
Moderately favorable ratings and moderately
unfavorable ratings may be different for
participants who experienced attitude
polarization than for participants who did not
experience attitude polarization. Moderately
favorable ratings and moderately unfavorable
ratings may also be different for participants
intolerant of ambiguity and participants
tolerant of ambiguity. Moderately favorable
ratings and moderately unfavorable ratings
may also be different for participants in the 45
second thought condition and participants in
the 90 second thought condition.
In order to determine if there was a
possible relationship between individuals’
tendencies to be weak or strong in their initial
ratings and other factors, I took the absolute
value of all initial ratings and summed those
values. Low scores were indicative of weak
attitudes and high scores were indicative of
strong attitudes. A possible range for scores
on extremity of initial attitudes was a
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 280. Actual
range of scores on extremity of initial
attitudes was a minimum of 78 and maximum
of 258. A possible relationship between
individuals’ tendencies to be weak or strong
in their initial ratings and attitude polarization
(i.e., total trichotomous change) was
examined.
First, there was no relationship
between individuals’ tendencies to be weak or
strong in their initial ratings and overall
attitude polarization, r = -.01. Second, there
was no relationship between individuals’
tendencies to be weak or strong in their initial
ratings and individual differences in
intolerance of ambiguity, r = -.04. Last, there
was no relationship for participants’ tendency
to be weak or strong in their initial ratings and

to which thought condition these participants
were randomly assigned, r=-.16. Although
there were individual differences in extremity
of initial attitudes, those differences were
unrelated to attitude polarization, intolerance
of ambiguity, or opportunity for thought
condition.
Discussion
It was expected that, in general,
individuals would experience increased
attitude polarization with an increased
opportunity for thought. It was also expected
that individuals intolerant of ambiguity would
experience more attitude polarization than
would individuals tolerant of ambiguity. Last,
it was expected that individuals intolerant of
ambiguity would experience more attitude
polarization with an increased opportunity for
thought than would individuals tolerant of
ambiguity with an increased opportunity for
thought.
These hypotheses in this study were
not supported. Individuals in the low
opportunity for thought condition and
individuals in the high opportunity for
thought condition did not differ in amount of
attitude polarization they experienced.
Individuals tolerant of ambiguity and
individuals intolerant of ambiguity did not
differ in amount of attitude polarization they
experienced. Regardless of thought condition,
individuals intolerant of ambiguity and
individuals tolerant of ambiguity did not
differ in amount of attitude polarization
experienced. In sum, results from this
experiment were not consistent with
hypotheses.
Plausible Alternative Explanations
In terms of the self generated attitude
change construct, results from this study
differ from results other researchers obtained
(see Tesser, et al., 1995, for a review). One
possible explanation for results obtained in
this study may be due to the nature of thought
manipulation. In other words, allocated times
for the opportunity for thought manipulation
may have been too long or too short. These
two times may not have been adequate to see
differences in attitude polarization. In some

studies, for example, researchers included
increasing increments of opportunity for
thought (e.g., Tesser & Conlee 1975). Tesser
(1976), for example, instructed participants to
think about an attitude object for 30, 60, 90,
and 180 seconds. In other studies, researchers
included a control condition during which
participants were not given a chance for
thought or were distracted from thought (e.g.,
Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Harton & Latane,
1997). Participants in this experiment were
instructed to think about an assigned issue for
either 45 seconds or 90 seconds. Other
researchers, however, found attitude
polarization when participants were given 45
versus 90 seconds of thought (e.g., Leone,
1996). Although this explanation (i.e., thought
manipulation not adequate) is possible, this
explanation may not be probable. Results
from this study, therefore, may not be due to
the nature of thought manipulation.
In this study, participants experienced
more attitude attenuation than attitude
polarization. Researchers have found that,
when individuals compare their beliefs
concerning people, objects, events, or issues
with the actual characteristics of those people,
objects, events, or issues (i.e., reality
constraint), attitude attenuation occurred (e.g.,
Rothbaum, et al., 1995). Researchers have
also found that when individuals are forced to
examine the derivation of their beliefs about
people, objects, events or issues (i.e., process
constraint) attitude attenuation occurred (e.g.,
Leone & Baldwin, 1983). Perhaps there was
an element of this procedure that
inadvertently involved reality or process
constraints. If participants think under reality
constraints or processes constraints during
thought about an assigned issue, then
participants may experience attitude
attenuation (e.g., Clary, et al., 1978).
In terms of the intolerance of
ambiguity construct, results from this study
differ from results other researchers obtained
(e.g., Feather, 1969). In this study,
participants completed Budner’s Intolerance
of Ambiguity Scale (1962). In other
intolerance of ambiguity studies, participants
completed other measures intolerance of

ambiguity. Examples of intolerance of
ambiguity measures used in other studies
include McDonald Scale (1970), RydellRosen Scale (1966), and Norton’s Scale
(1975). Scores on these aforementioned
measures of intolerance of ambiguity may be
more valid than scores on Budner’s
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (see Furhnam,
1994 for a review). If scores on Budners
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale are not valid,
then there would not be an effect for
intolerance of ambiguity on attitude
polarization.
Although there are differences in
validity for scores on Budner’s Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale and scores on other
measures of intolerance of ambiguity, this
explanation (i.e., lack of validity for scores on
Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale)
may not be probable. Researchers have
demonstrated that scores on Budner’s
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (1962) have
test-retest reliability (see Robinson & Shaver,
1973). Researchers also demonstrated
convergent validity with three other measures
of intolerance of ambiguity (ref). Last,
researchers demonstrated construct validity
for Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale
in that scores on this scale are related to other
theoretically meaningful constructs such as
prejudice and racism (e.g., Hassan &
Khalique, 1987; Sidanius, 1978). Budner’s
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale was selected
for use in this study because it is the most
cited and widely used intolerance of
ambiguity scale. Results of intolerance of
ambiguity on attitude polarization in this
study, therefore, are not likely due to a lack of
validity or reliability for scores on Budner’s
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale.
Although researchers have
demonstrated that scores on this scale are
reliable and valid, perhaps intolerance of
ambiguity is not related in a meaningful way
to self generated attitude change. There may
be other constructs, however, that are related
to self generated attitude change. These other
constructs may include need for cognition and
dogmatism.

Need for cognition is the degree to
which individuals engage in and enjoy
effortful cognitive endeavors (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982). Individuals can either be high in
need for cognition or low in need for
cognition. Individuals high in need for
cognition tend to engage in and enjoy
effortful thought. These individuals “prefer
complex to simple problems” (Cacioppo,
Petty, & Kao, 1984). Individuals high in need
for cognition also tend to scrutinize the merits
of a message (i.e., central route) when
determining their attitudes about an issue
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). On the other hand,
individuals low in need for cognition do not
tend to engage in and enjoy effortful thought.
These individuals “find little satisfaction in
deliberating hard and for long hours”
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Individuals low in
need for cognition also tend to rely on
heuristics (i.e., peripheral route) such as
source attractiveness or length of message
when determining their attitudes about an
issue (Cacioppo et al., 1981). Researchers
found that, when given an opportunity for
thought, individuals low in need for cognition
polarize their attitudes more than do
individuals high in need for cognition (cf.,
Lassiter & Apple, 1998; Lassiter, Apple, &
Slaw, 1996; Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley,
1986).
Dogmatism has been conceptualized
in terms of differences in the nature of belief
systems. Individuals use belief systems to
understand their world around them and to
protect themselves from potentially
threatening information and ideas (Rokeach,
1960). Individuals can either be dogmatic or
non-dogmatic. Dogmatic individuals’ belief
systems are characterized by a high degree of
isolation. These individuals may
compartmentalize or separate beliefs that
other individuals would integrate. Dogmatic
individuals avoid, ignore, or selectively forget
attitude-discrepant information because these
individuals find inconsistency of beliefs
intolerable (e.g., Leone, 1989). On the other
hand, non-dogmatic individuals’ belief
systems are characterized by a high degree of
openness. These individuals can make

connections between beliefs that are logically
related. Non-dogmatic individuals do not
ignore, avoid, or selectively forget attitudediscrepant information because these
individuals find inconsistency of beliefs
tolerable (e.g., Leone, 1989). Researchers
found that, when given an opportunity for
thought, dogmatic individuals polarize their
attitudes more than do non-dogmatic
individuals (e.g., Leone, 1989; Leone, Taylor,
& Adams, 1991).
Although the there was no effect for
self generated attitude change and intolerance
of ambiguity in this study, there was an
unexpected interaction between order of
presentation and intolerance of ambiguity.
Participants intolerant of ambiguity were
equally likely as participants tolerant of
ambiguity to experience attitude polarization
when asked to first complete an attitude
measure and then complete Budner’s
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. Participants
intolerant of ambiguity were more likely than
participants tolerant of ambiguity to
experience attitude attenuation when asked to
first complete the Intolerance of Ambiguity
Scale and then complete an attitude measure.
One possible explanation for this
unexpected finding may be a priming effect
(Srull & Wyer, 1980). A priming effect
occurs when activating a schema increases
accessibility for individuals to readily use that
activated schema (Srull & Wyer, 1980).
Individuals are likely to use schemas for
which they have been primed because these
schemas are accessible. When participants
answer questions about themselves,
participants’ self-concepts become accessible
(Wentura & Greve, 2005). When participants
completed the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale
first, participants may have become aware of
their tendency to be tolerant or intolerant of
ambiguity. Participants who are intolerant of
ambiguity have different self-concepts from
participants who are tolerant of ambiguity.
Participants who are made aware that they are
intolerant of ambiguity may have
incorporated into their self-concept that they
are rigid and narrow minded. Participants who
are made aware that they are tolerant of

ambiguity may have incorporated into their
self-concept that they are indecisive and
ambivalent. In turn, participants may feel
uncomfortable by their self-concept.
Participants who were made aware of
their tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity
may have attempted to respond in ways that
would disconfirm negative stereotypes (e.g.,
narrow-minded) about individuals intolerant
of ambiguity. Participants who were made
aware of their tendency to be tolerant of
ambiguity may have attempted to respond in
ways that would disconfirm negative
stereotypes (e.g., ambivalent) about
individuals tolerant of ambiguity. Researchers
maintain that stereotype threat occurs when
individuals are concerned with confirming a
negative stereotype (e.g., African Americans
as unintelligent) of a group to which these
individuals belong (Steele & Aronson, 1995).
Individuals who experience stereotype threat
may try to disconfirm negative stereotypes
about themselves (Steele & Aronson, 1995).
These individuals, for example, may
disengage from group norms in order to
disconfirm a stereotype (Aronson, Blanton, &
Cooper, 1995; Steele, 1997). If participants
intolerant of ambiguity were made aware of
the fact they were intolerant (i.e., rigid), then
these participants may have responded in
ways that would disconfirm the stereotype of
intolerant individuals as rigid. In one
condition, participants completed the
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner,
1962) first. As a result of being primed to
think about their self-concept, participants
may have become aware of the degree to
which they are intolerant of ambiguity.
Perhaps participants intolerant of ambiguity
modified responses in an effort to appear
more socially acceptable (i.e., adaptable) than
socially unacceptable (i.e., rigid). If
participants modified responses in an effort to
appear socially desirable, then participants
would experience attitude attenuation rather
than attitude polarization.
Limitations of Current Thesis
One possible limitation in this study is
the unknown validity of the opportunity for

thought manipulation. Although participants
were instructed to think about a particular
issue for either 45 seconds or 90 seconds,
participants may not have been thinking about
that assigned issue. Alternatively, participants
were perhaps thinking about an issue when
instructed to do so, but then may not have
engaged in any of the self generated attitude
change microprocesses (i.e., generate
additional beliefs, reinterpret existing beliefs,
or discount inconsistent beliefs). In other
words, just because participants were
instructed to think about an issue does not
mean that these participants thought about
that assigned issue. Also, participants may
have thought about assigned issues but did not
generate additional thoughts about those
assigned issues, reinterpret existing thoughts
about those assigned issues, or discount
inconsistent thoughts about those assigned
issues. If participants did not think about an
assigned issue or did not engage in the self
generated attitude change microprocesses
when thinking about an assigned issue, then
these participants would not experience
attitude polarization.
A second possible limitation of this
study may be the use of political, social, and
campus issues. Researchers have shown that
participants with well developed mental
representations (i.e., schemas) experience
more attitude polarization than do participants
with poorly developed mental representations
(e.g., Tesser & Leone, 1977). Participants
may not have had well developed schemas for
some or all of the issues used in this study.
One example of an issue used in this study is
“Euthanasia should be a legal, personal
choice”. Some of these participants, for
example, may not be familiar with the
concept of euthanasia. If participants do not
have well developed schemas for these issues,
then these participants are not able to engage
in the self generated attitude change
microprocesses.
A third possible limitation of this
study is the use of self-report measures.
Participants responded to a self-report
measure when they rated their degree of
agreement or disagreement toward each issue.

Participants also responded to a self-report
measure during completion of Budner’s
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (1962). When
participants respond to a self-report measure
they are susceptible to certain response sets
(e.g., social desirability or acquiescence
responding).
Participants may attempt to respond in
a socially desirable manner to statements
about each issue as well as to items on the
Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner,
1962). Participants engage in social
desirability responding when they respond to
statements in ways which makes them look
good to themselves or others (Rosenberg,
Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968).
Participants, for example, may agree or
disagree with an issue based on how these
participants think most college students feel
about that issue. If participants think that most
college students hold negative attitudes
toward a particular issue, then these
participants may respond in a socially
desirable fashion by indicating a negative
attitude toward that particular issue. When
participants respond in a socially desirable
manner, researchers are not accurately
measuring participants’ attitudes.
Participants may also acquiesce with
responses to statements about each issue as
well as to items on the Intolerance of
Ambiguity Scale (Budner, 1962). Participants
engage in acquiescence responding when they
agree with any statement that sounds
reasonable (Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, &
Miyake, 1995). Participants, for example,
may agree that professors should not have to
pay to park on campus because participants
think that this statement sounds reasonable.
When participants simply agree with a
statement about an issue because it sounds
reasonable, researchers are not accurately
measuring participants’ attitudes.
Future Directions
Researchers could include a
manipulation check for the opportunity for
thought manipulation. Researchers, in
previous studies, have used illuminated lights
as a means of instructing participants to think

about an attitude object (Tesser, 1976).
Researchers could instruct participants to
illuminate a light when thinking about an
assigned issue. If participants are indicating
they are thinking about an assigned issue by
illuminating a light, then researchers know
participants are engaging in thought.
Although researchers can measure if
participants are thinking about an assigned
issue when participants illuminate a light,
researchers cannot, however, use this
manipulation check to measure what
participants are thinking about during
thought. If researchers want to measure what
participants are thinking about during thought
about an assigned issue, then researchers can
instruct participants to write arguments or
ideas concerning an attitude object (e.g.,
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Pomerantz,
Chaiken, &Tordesillas, 1995).
Researchers could also include several
different measures of intolerance of
ambiguity. Researchers could determine
convergent validity if participants completed
several intolerance of ambiguity scales. If
researchers included different measures of
intolerance of ambiguity, then researchers
may have increased confidence with effects
for intolerance of ambiguity on attitude
polarization.
Researchers could also include other
kinds of stimuli (e.g., paintings, fashion) for
which participants think about during an
opportunity for thought. In this study, the
participants thought about political, social, or
campus issues. These issues may have been
too broad to get an effect for attitude
polarization. Instead of measuring attitudes
for a broad range of issues, researchers in
future studies could measure attitudes about
specific issues (e.g., “war on terror”).
Researchers could also include the use
of priming effects with different personality
variables such as dogmatism. Participants
may access their self-concept if they become
aware of certain personality characteristics
(e.g., dogmatic). Once participants are primed
with knowing their personality characteristics,
researchers could then study if participants
are susceptible to stereotype threat.

Researchers studying stereotype threat
generally examine this effect with a specific
group of people (e.g., Women or African
Americans) for which stereotypes are salient.
Although some researchers (e.g., Brown &
Pinel, 2003) examined the effects of
stereotype threat with individual difference
variables (e.g., stigma consciousness),
researchers have not examined stereotype
threat with political affiliation. Although
individuals who affiliate with different
political agenda possess certain personality
characteristics, these characteristics are not
usually salient. Once individuals are made
aware that they posses certain characteristics,
individuals may become aware of stereotypes
concerning these characteristics (e.g. liberals
as bleeding-hearts, conservatives as “moralorder” elitists). If participants are made aware
of certain personality characteristics (e.g.,
liberal vs. conservative), then researchers may
find an effect for stereotype threat with
personality variables.
Recall the opening paragraph.
Individuals who favored conservative
positions (e.g., personal responsibility)
supported by President George W. Bush may
have donated money to his political party.
Individuals who favored liberal positions
(e.g., social responsibility) supported by
Senator John Kerry may have stood along
busy roadways flashing signs in support of his
party. If, however, conservative voters
involved in Bush’s campaign were made
aware of negative stereotypes of
conservatives as insensitive to working-class
citizens then these conservatives may try to
disconfirm these negative stereotypes by
voting against party lines. In turn, if liberal
voters involved in Kerry’s campaign were
made aware of negative stereotypes of liberals
as financially irresponsible, then these liberals
may try to disconfirm these negative
stereotypes by voting against party lines.
Understanding attitudes and the mechanisms
of attitude change has broad, real world
implications.
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